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"WW III? No thanks...!" On-Line Library
What is an appropropriate response?
Political and philosophical considerations after the attack on the Word Trade
Center
ENDLESS WAR?
by Walden Bello
Executive Director of Focus on the Global South September 2001
The assault on the World Trade Center was horrific, despicable, and
unpardonable, but it is important not to lose perspective, especially a
historical one. For a response that is dictated primarily by fury such as
that now displayed by some American politicians, while understandable, is
likely to simply serve as one more proof for Santayana's dictum that those
who do not remember history are bound to repeat it.
THE MORAL EQUATION
The scale and consequences of the World Trade Center attack are massive
indeed, but this was not the worst act of mass terrorism in US history, as
some US media are wont to claim. The over 5000 lives lost in New York are
irreplaceable, but one must not forget that the atomic raids on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki killed 210,000 people, most of them civilians, most perishing
instantaneously. But one may object that you can't really compare the World
Trade Center attack to the nuclear bombings since, after all, Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were targets in a war. But why not, since the purpose of the
nuclear bombings was not mainly to destroy military or infrastructural
targets, but to terrorize and destroy the civilian population? Indeed, the
whole allied air campaign against Germany and Japan in 1944-45, which
produced the firestorms in Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo, that killed tens
of thousands had as its central aim to kill and maim as many civilians as
possible. Similarly, during the Korean War, terror bombing of civilians
was the policy of the US Air Force's Far Eastern Command, which was
instructed to pulverize anything that moved in enemy territory. So
successful was the policy that in the summer of 1951, the commander was
able to report that "there is no structure left to be targeted."
During the Cold War, mass elimination of the enemy's civilian population,
alongside the destruction of his armed forces or industry, was
institutionalized in the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation that lay
at the center of the doctrine of Deterrence. In Vietnam, where the US was
frustrated by the fact that combatants and civilians were
indistinguishable, indiscriminate killing of civilians was a central part
of a "counterinsurgency war" in which 20,000 civilians were systematically
assassinated under the CIA's Operation Phoenix Program in the Mekong Delta.
But must not such actions against civilians be judged in the context of a
broader strategic objective of sapping the enemy's will to fight and thus
bring the war to a conclusion? But then how different is this
justification from the terrorists' aim to change the foreign policy of the
US government by eroding the support of the country's civilian population?
The point is not to engage in a "maleficent calculus," as Jeremy Bentham
would have called this exercise, but to point out that the US government
hardly possesses the high ground in the current moral equation. Indeed,
one can say that terrorists like Osama bin Laden, an ex-CIA prot?g?, have
learned their lessons on the strategic targeting of the civilian
population from Washington's traditional strategy of total warfare, where
damage to the civilian population is not simply seen as collateral but as
essential to achieving the ends of war.
THE CLAUSEWITZIAN CALCULUS
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center assault, the perpetrators of
the dastardly deed have been called "irrational" or "madmen" or people
that embody evil. This is understandable as an emotional reaction but
dangerous as a basis for policy. The truth is the perpetrators of the deed
were very rational. If they were indeed people connected with Osama bin
Laden, their goal was most likely to raise the costs to the United States
of maintaining its current policies in the Middle East, which they
consider unjust and inequitable, and this was their way of doing it. They
very rationally picked the targets and weapons to be used, paying
attention not only to maximum destruction but also to maximum symbolism.
The choice of the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon as the
targets, and American Airlines and United Airlines planes as the delivery
vehicles doubling as warheads, was the product of cold-blooded thinking
and planning. The loss of their own lives was factored into the
calculation. What we saw was a rational calculus of means to achieve a
desired end. In the view of these people, terrorism, like war, is the
extension of politics by other means. These are Clausewitzian minds, and
the worst mistake one can make is to regard them as madmen.
PEARL HARBOR OR TET?
One metaphor that the Washington establishment has used to capture the
essence of recent events is that of a second Pearl Harbor, with the
implication that, like the first, the September 11 tragedy will galvanize
the American people to an unprecedented level of unity to win the war
against still unidentified enemies. The other side, one suspects, operates
with a different metaphor, and this is that of the Tet Offensive of 1968.
The objective of the Vietnamese was to launch massive simultaneous
uprisings that, even if defeated separately, would nevertheless add up to
a strategic victory by convincing the other side, especially its civilian
base, that the war was unwinnable. The aim was to rob the US of the will
to win the war, and here the Vietnamese succeeded.
The perpetrators of World Trade Center assault are operating with a
similar calculus, and, despite the current jingoistic talk in Washington,
it is not certain that they are wrong. Will the American people really
bear any burden and pay any price in a struggle that will persist way into
the future, with no assurance of victory, indeed, with no clear sense of
who the enemies are and of what "victory" will consist of? The media is
full of news about the creation of an alliance against terrorism,
conveying the impression that coordination among key states combined with
the outrage of citizens everywhere will give a Washington-led coalition an
unbeatable edge. Perhaps in the short run, although even this is not
certain. For the problem is that, as in guerrilla wars, this is not a war
that will be won strictly or mainly by military means.
THE UNDERLYING ISSUES
If it was bin Laden's network that was responsible for the World Trade
Center attack, then the underlying issues are the twin pillars of US
policy in the Middle East. One is subordination of the interests of the
peoples of the region to the US' untrammeled access to Middle East oil in
order to maintain its petroleum-based civilization. To this end, the US
overthrew the nationalist government of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953,
cultivated the repressive Shah of Iran as the gendarme of the Persian Gulf,
supported anti-democratic feudal regimes in the Arabian peninsula, and
introduced a massive permanent military presence in Saudi Arabia, which
contains some of Islam's most sacred shrines and cities.
The war against Saddam Hussein was justified as a war to beat back
aggression, but everybody knew that Washington's key motivation was to
ensure that the region's most massive oil reserves would remain under the
control of pro-Western elites.
The other pillar is unstinting support for Israel. That Arab feelings
about Israel are so elemental is not difficult to comprehend. It is hard
to argue against the fact that the state of Israel was born on the basis
of the massive dispossession of the Palestinian people from their country
and their lands. It is impossible to deny that Israel is a European
settler-state, one whose establishment was essentially a displacement from
European territory of the ethno-cultural contradictions of European society.
The Holocaust was an unspeakable crime against humanity, but it was
utterly wrong to impose its political consequences--chief of which was the
creation of Israel--on a people who had nothing to do with it.
It is hard to contradict Arab claims that it was essentially support from
the United States that created the state of Israel; that it has been
massive US military aid and backing that has maintained it in the last
half century; and that it is deep confidence in perpetual US military and
political support that enables Israel to oppose in practice the emergence
of a viable Palestinian state.
Unless the US abandons these two pillars of its policies, there will
always be thousands of recruits for acts of terrorism such as that which
occurred last week. And while we may condemn terrorist acts--as we must,
strongly-- it is another thing to expect desperate people not to adopt
them, especially when they can point to the fact that it was such methods
that targeted civilians as well as military personnel, combined with the
Intifada, that forced Israel to agree to the 1993 Oslo Accord that led to
the creation of the Palestinian entity.
Yet another reason why the strategic equation does not favor the US is
that there are a great many people in the world that are ambivalent about
terrorism. In contrast to Europe, there has been a relatively muted
response to the World Trade Center event in the South. A survey would
probably reveal that while many people in the Third World are appalled by
hijackers' methods, they are not unsympathetic to their objectives. As one
Chinese-Filipino entrepreneur said, "It's horrible, but on the other hand,
the US had it coming." If this reaction is common among middle class
people, it would not be surprising if such ambivalence towards terrorism
is widespread among the 80 per cent of the world's population that are
marginalized by current global political and economic arrangements.
There is simply too much distrust, dislike, or just plain hatred of a
country that has become so callous in its pursuit of economic power and
arrogant in its political and military relations with the rest of the
world and so brazen in declaring its cultural superiority over the rest of
us. As in the equation of guerrilla war, civilian ambivalence in the
theater of battle translates strategically to a minus when it comes to the
staying power of the authorities and a plus when it comes to that of the
terrorists.
In sum, if there is one thing we can be certain of, it is that massive
retaliation on the part of the US will not put an end to terrorism. It
will simply amplify the upward spiral of violence, as the other side will
resort to even more spectacular deeds, fed by unending waves of recruits.
The September 11 tragedy is the clearest evidence of the bankruptcy of the
30-year-old policy of mailed fist, massive retaliation response to
terrorism. This policy has simply resulted in the extreme
professionalization of terrorism.
The only response that will really contribute to global security and peace
is for Washington to address not the symptoms but the roots of terrorism.
It is for the United States to reexamine and substantially change its
policies in the Middle East and the Third World, supporting for a change
arrangements that will not stand in the way of the achievement of equity,
justice, and genuine national sovereignty for currently marginalized
peoples. Any other way leads to endless war.
Source: http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2001/endless_war.html